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Introduction
For the law of one price -as known from the standard homogeneous goods Bertrand model -to be valid, consumers must be aware of all offered prices for the product (Stigler, 1961) . Electricity may be considered as such a kind of product, since it does not matter for the final consumer where and how it was produced. Therefore, one may assume that the transition from local monopoly supply to a more competitive environment after market liberalization should lead to price convergence with additional firm entry, until the law of one price holds. We focus on the German retail market, which was liberalized in 1999 (when the EU Directive 96/92/EC came into force). Since then, customers have had the freedom to choose their electricity supplier.
For example, in 2014 a household customer had the choice between 73 and 198 providers, depending on its location. Nevertheless, even though 17 years have passed since, our data reveal that price dispersion has been pronounced and persisting despite considerable firm entry.
One possible explanation would be that electricity only appears to be a homogenous product, yet there might be some form of product differentiation, such as differences in service quality, certification with a "green" label 1 , or marketing. Giulietti et al. (2014, p.559) , however, argue that "product differentiation (…) is unlikely to be important in explaining differences between large established firms selling such a fundamentally homogenous product." Moreover, Stigler (1961) argues that not all of the observed price dispersion can be attributed to (marginal) product differentiation. In his view, the existence of significant search frictions directly induces price dispersion even in homogeneous goods markets. Thus, "price dispersion is a manifestation -and, indeed is a measure of ignorance in the market." (Stigler 1961, p.214) . While theory proofs that there will be no price dispersion when either all or no consumers are informed, there will be price dispersion in between (Stahl, 1989) .
The nexus between search frictions, competition, and price dispersion for homogenous goods has received much attention in the literature. Theoretical studies (e.g. Stahl, 1989; Baye and Morgan, 2001; Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004) show that for homogenous goods, such as electricity, price dispersion may represent an equilibrium outcome when customers differ in their search intensities. Thus, it may be 1 In our sample, less than 4% of all search requests relate to tariffs with eco-labels. Therefore, in the present application we exclude search requests that only consider eco label tariffs in order to rule out pricing effects from such a form of product differentiation. However, the results remain fully robust when these searches are also included.
1 beneficial for firms to either charge a high price for customers with low (or no) search intensity, or to charge a low price for customers who do engage in costly search for price quotations. 2 Moreover, the number of firms may affect price dispersion and there may be reverse causality running from price dispersion to search intensity.
We add on this topic by analyzing how both consumer information and competition impact on price dispersion and prices in the German electricity retail market for the period 2011-2014. This paper is the first empirical attempt to analyze these relations altogether. Importantly, we are the first to employ a unique dataset on actual consumer search requests as a direct measure of search intensity in a panel data context. Furthermore, we are able to consider the endogenous nature of search with respect to price and price dispersion. The most important decisive feature is our ability to distinguish the price setting behavior of the local incumbent suppliers -whose consumers are uninformed -from the cheapest entrant firms -whose consumers are informed. Hence, we are not only able to investigate the effects of both consumer search and competition on price dispersion, but also to deduct how the incumbents and entrants set their prices. It is this combination of (1) applying a direct measure of search intensity, (2) recognizing the endogeneity of search intensity and (3) taking advantage of heterogeneous shares of informed versus uninformed consumers between incumbents and entrants in our empirical analysis that makes our study painting a fuller picture of the intricate relations.
In our sample, each of the 8,824 German zip codes is served by one of the 777 local incumbent electricity retailer, which represents the former local monopoly supplier.
Prior to market liberalization, the local incumbent would have served all local customers in its distribution grid area. After the liberalization, those customers with low search costs were more likely to change to a cheaper entrant supplier, while customers with high search costs were more likely to stay with the incumbent. From this, we claim that in particular the local incumbent retailer is associated with customers with high search costs and thus low search intensity, while the entrant retailers attract customers with no or low search costs and thus high search intensity. 3 2 In this sense, Giulietti et al. (2014) highlight that search costs represent the main reason for low switching behavior and for observing large price differences between incumbents and entrants in electricity retail in the UK. 3 In this regard, there is evidence of significant search costs. Giulietti et al. (2014) point to high search costs in electricity retail in the UK, and of Hortacsu et al. (2015) find that customers of the incumbent only search in about 2% of months or approximately once every 4-5 years.
Thus, we may draw inference about price setting of incumbents and entrants from heterogeneity in consumer information, which has not been examined thus far.
Our data provide suitable and detailed spatially varying measures for the dependent variables (price dispersion, price of cheapest entrant, and price of incumbent) and for our main variables of interest, namely the number of firms competing for customers and consumer search intensity. The latter variable is hardly observable and, hence, generally unknown to the researcher (Baye et al., 2006) . 4 We utilize information on all search requests (i.e. clicks) from the main German online price comparison platforms for electricity retail tariffs for the period 2011-2014 to develop a direct measure of consumer information. Price comparison websites display all retail tariffs available at the address of the respective customer. Hence, we interpret consumer search in the sense of a non-sequential clearinghouse model as in Stahl (1989) . 5 We stress that sequential search models may have been more accurate in picturing consumers' price quotations in electricity retail in the past when online comparison platforms were less prevalent and, thus, consumers had to search for information about individual firms' prices. For example, Giulietti et al. (2014) et al., 2006) may have become more precise due to the emergence of comprehensive online search platforms as the standard searching devices (Montgomery et al. 2004). 7 Hence, at present, most of the costly search refers to finding out about the yearly electricity consumption level of the household and finding and opening the comparison website. Once this step is overcome, all available local prices in the zip code are shown to the consumer simultaneously. Giulietti et al. (2014, p. 576 ) corroborate that by stating that "(…) non-sequential search might be a good approximation of search behavior (…) if consumers use price comparison sites." It is therefore reasonable that 4 We come back to this issue in section 2.1 where we discuss the relevant empirical literature. 5 See, for example, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) , Pennersdorfer et al. (2015) , and Tang et al. (2010) for similar approaches. 6 Another example of sequential search would be consumers who call their local suppliers or visit their websites in order to make price quotations. After each quotation, the consumer may decide whether he/she continues to make another price quotation. 7 Similarly, De los Santos et al. (2012) reach the conclusion that fixed sample size search models have become more accurate than sequential search models. the consumer who engages in non-sequential search at an online comparison platform choses the cheapest price among all available local prices. 8
In our econometric approach we face one caveat that we cannot rule out potential simultaneity of both variables of interest, consumer search and competition, with the dependent variables, price dispersion and prices of incumbents and entrants. For this reason, we make use of an instrumental variables approach in order to circumvent the endogeneity problem and to determine causal effects of both variables. Our empirical results correspond well with findings from the respective theoretical literature. In line with Stahl (1989) , we find that price dispersion follows an inverse U-shape relation with consumer information. That is, while more information leads to an increase in price dispersion to begin with, eventually -after a large part of consumers have informed themselves -price dispersion declines again. Somewhat in contrast to Stahl (1989) , we find that the incumbent's price increases albeit at a decreasing rate (inverse U-shape), and in line with Stahl (1989) the entrant's price decreases at a decreasing rate (U-shape) with the share of informed consumers. With respect to competition, price dispersion follows an inverse U-shape as indicated by Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) . Additional firms in the market cause the incumbent's price to rise at a declining rate (inverse U-shape), whereas the entrant's price falls at a declining rate (U-shape).
In addition, we extend our findings on the price setting behavior of incumbent and entrant firms by alternative regressions on markups and Lerner indices. Besides, the robustness of our empirical findings is confirmed by running all regressions at different household sizes (at different yearly consumption levels). What is more, we show that semi-parametric estimation allowing for flexible functional relationships particularly support the parametric estimates.
Importantly, our results show that the assumption of equal shares of informed versus uninformed consumers across firms -as generally assumed in the theoretical (e.g. Baye and Morgan, 2001; Stahl, 1989 ) and empirical (e.g. Chandra and Tappata, 2011; Pennersdorfer et al., 2014; Tang et al., 2010) literature -is not necessarily tenable. Price setting incentives differ across firms, e.g. incumbents versus entrants, according to their "endowment" of informed and uninformed consumers. We contend that incumbent firms, which are associated with uninformed consumers, follow opposing and mutually exclusive pricing strategies with respect to both consumer search and competition, compared to entrant firms, which face substantially larger shares of informed consumers. This determines whether firms follow a pricing strategy to either attract market shares from new customers who are willing to engage in search ("business-stealing effect") or to extract rents from existing customers who do not engage in search ("surplus-appropriation effect"). 9
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 provides a background on electricity retail in Germany. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 the econometric model. Section 6 discusses the results, and section 7 concludes.
Relevant literature on price dispersion

2.1.Relevant empirical literature on price dispersion
The empirical literature on search frictions can be broadly categorized into studies (1) that look at the determinants and effects of price dispersion and (2) studies that structurally estimate search (and switching) costs or directly analyze the search behavior of consumers. Studies to (1) may be differentiated according to whether they incorporate direct information on search intensity and studies that do not. Moreover, some studies recognize the endogeneity of the intensity of search with price dispersion. Baye et al. (2006) provide an excellent survey.
Studies that do not employ direct measures of search intensity include e.g. Sorensen (2000) , Barron et al. (2004) , Baye et al. (2004) , Lewis (2008) , and Chandra and Tappata (2011) . Sorensen (2000) , a seminal study in the field, finds that price-cost margins and price dispersion are negatively correlated with the purchase frequency of drugs, which can be interpreted as indirect evidence that search costs are important determinants of pricing strategies. Most studies find a negative effect of the number of sellers on price dispersion, e.g. for retail gasoline Barron et al. (2004) and Lewis (2008) , and for electronics products Chandra and Tappata (2011) and Baye et al. (2004) . Two results are worth mentioning in our context. 9 In a similar manner, Ericson (2014, p. 44 ) refers to these effects as "investment motive" -firms acquire market shares in order to extract consumers' rents in future periods -and "harvesting motive" -firms maximize profits from their existing customers. Chandra and Tappata (2011) using detailed information on competitors' locations in the U.S. retail gasoline market infer from their results that there is a negative relation between price dispersion and search intensity. However, they do not employ a direct measure of search intensity stating that it would be "ideal" to have a control group of no search. We take incumbents in electricity retail as such a "control" group, and show below that the relations between price dispersion/average prices and search intensity are intricate, namely non-linear and moreover dependent on the type of firms (low/high search intensity of customer base, i.e. incumbent or entrant).
The novel feature of Lewis (2008) is that the study looks at differentiated products (high-brand versus other gasoline stations) and, somewhat similarly to us, assumes that customers of high-brand stations are less likely to search (we assume that incumbent customers are less likely to search). Accordingly, Lewis (2008) finds that while price dispersion declines with station density for low-brand stations, price dispersion does not decline with station density if the station is high-brand. This implies that consumer heterogeneity interacts with seller heterogeneity. While Lewis (2008) 's results are novel in that respect, the study does not employ a direct measure of search intensity, and thus cannot analyze its endogenous nature. In addition to analyzing different types of firms (incumbent versus entrants), we employ such a measure for search intensity (number of clicks per zip code looking for electricity retail tariffs) and also instrument for search intensity and competition by truly exogenous shifters (i.e. new households, moved households, age of household heads for search intensity; number of households for competition).
The main drawback of the above studies is that they do not employ direct measures of search intensity and therefore they can only indirectly draw inference. Brown and Golsbee (2002) , in contrast, use the variation in the share of consumers searching on the internet as their measure of consumer information. 10 They find that increased internet usage has resulted in an increase of price dispersion (in the market for term-life insurance) at low levels and a decrease of price dispersion at high levels of internet usage. While we get similar results for electricity retail, there are two shortcomings in the Brown and Golsbee (2002) study we seek to avoid. First, it does not incorporate the competitive environment in life insurance, let alone type differences among firms, and second it does not tackle the potential endogeneity of internet usage, i.e. internet usage could be higher if there is more price dispersion, since expected gains 10 Ellison and Ellison (2005) and Ellison and Ellison (2009) question the extent to which the internet has actually reduced consumer search costs due to "bait and wait" and "obfuscation" strategies used by firms. 6 from obtaining information from shopbots (i.e. online comparison platforms) will increase with the dispersion of prices (see also Baye and Morgan, 2001) .
More recently, Tang et al. (2010) Baye et al. (2009) find that a firm enjoys a 60% jump in its clicks when it offers the lowest price at a comparison site. Hortacsu et al. (2015) find that -while households rarely search for alternative retailers in electricitythey search more after a "bill shock" in the previous months. Moreover, households attach a brand advantage to the incumbent. differences across firms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first study employing (1) a direct measure of search intensity, (2) recognizing its endogenous nature, and (3) distinguishing between types of firms (incumbents versus entrants). As we will show below, this is essential, because firms behave differently depending on the importance they attribute to informed versus uninformed customers.
2.2.Relevant theoretical literature on price dispersion and hypotheses
Our empirical approach builds on the existing theoretical literature on the nexus between pricing, competition, and search costs. There are numerous theoretical models trying to explain the impact of asymmetric consumer information, which arises from differing search and/or switching costs, on price dispersion. Most relevant for our setting is a clearinghouse model developed by Stahl (1989) , which is based on Varian's (1980) model. We also refer to other theoretical works that generally build on these models. Besides, Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) develop a non-sequential fixed sample size search model that bears important implications for our empirical analysis. Stahl's (1989) model assumes a fraction of consumers who have no search costs ("shoppers") and thus are fully informed about the full price distribution in the market.
These consumers have information about all available prices and buy from the cheapest supplier. The remaining share of consumers (1 − ) pays a search cost for each price quotation and engage in sequential search until they obtain a price quotation that is below their endogenously determined reservation price.
As opposed to Stahl (1989) 's model, where informed consumers are assumed to have zero search costs, in the electricity retail market informed consumers still have positive search costs. Nonetheless, the informed consumers obtain all available price quotes for their respective zip code from an online comparison website (i.e. a clearinghouse), which may severely lower their search costs compared to the uninformed consumers. Hence, the fraction of informed consumers who gather information from a clearinghouse will only buy at the lowest price. 12 The other fraction of uninformed or brand loyal (see Baye et al., 2004) consumers will stay with their incumbent suppliers and purchase at higher prices. Consequently, we interpret consumers who collect price quotes from online search platforms as informed consumers (i.e. "shoppers") as presented in Stahl's model ( ).
According to Stahl (1989) , when consumers have asymmetric search costs (0 < < 1), price dispersion represents a Nash equilibrium because firms do not follow pure strategies but randomly draw from an equilibrium price distribution (i.e. mixed strategies). 13 Barron et al. (2004 Barron et al. ( , p. 1049 ) stress that all firms get the same expected profit form mixed strategies: "a low price reduces the returns from sales to the uninformed, but this is exactly offset by the increase in expected returns arising from the increased likelihood that the seller will be the lowest-priced seller, and thus sell to all of the informed consumers." Moreover, there are two extreme cases, for which price dispersion vanishes. When all consumers are uninformed ( = 0), all firms charge monopoly prices (Diamond's outcome). On the contrary, when all consumers are fully informed ( = 1), all firms charge Walrasian prices (Bertrand outcome). Stahl (1989) shows that as the proportion of informed consumers increases gradually from = 0 to = 1, the price distribution shifts downwards monotonically and the average price falls. Nevertheless, it is not clear-cut how the support of the price distribution behaves as shifts from zero to one. Stahl (1989) argues that as the number of "shoppers" increases, both the upper and the lower bounds of the support shift downward (see also Tang et al., 2010) . This argument seems somewhat ad-hoc for the upper bound of the distribution, as expected prices may fall even though the upper bound of the distribution (i.e. the incumbent supplier's price in our study) may stay unchanged or may even increase.
In Stahl's (1989) model, price dispersion follows an inverted U-shape with an increasing fraction of informed consumers between the two extreme cases of monopoly pricing and the Bertrand outcome for the following reasons (see also Baye et al., 2006) .
From the starting point of = 0, where all firms charge the same monopoly price, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers ( ) provides firms with an incentive to undercut prices in order to attract consumers who search for prices. As a result, price dispersion increases. Once reaches a certain threshold, more mass of the price support shifts downward and hence price dispersion starts to decline until it eventually converges to the Bertrand outcome. Pennersdorfer et al. (2014) underpin this statement by providing a mathematical proof. Chandra and Tappata (2011) provide an intuition for the behavior of price dispersion, as low gains from search arise for consumers when search intensity is either low or high, however, gains are higher when search intensity takes up an intermediate level. 13 Varian (1980) provides the same finding.
Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) provide a non-sequential search model where search is endogenous to firm entry and where the fraction of uninformed consumers searches with differing intensity. Two counteracting forces are prevalent in the market:
The business-stealing effect causes firms to charge low prices in order to attract informed consumers who engage in search. The surplus-appropriation effect lets firms charge high prices for the uninformed consumers who do not compare prices. Price dispersion may be an equilibrium result in this model as it may be beneficial for firms to either charge a high price for customers with medium or low search intensity or a low price for customers with high search intensity. Similarly, Chandra and Tappata (2011) postulate that, holding consumer information constant, an increase in the number of firms in the market brings about two effects. First, each firm loses parts of its uninformed consumers. Second, the probability of having the lowest price decreases exponentially. Both effects cause firms to set more extreme prices increasing price dispersion. Moreover, they show that price dispersion increases with higher competition at a decreasing rate.
In our setting, the consumers willing to stay with their local incumbent suppliers at higher tariffs, as they do not engage in search, correspond well with Janssen and
Moraga-González's (2004) consumers with medium or low search intensity. On the other hand, the informed consumers of the cheapest entrant firms may represent the group of consumers with high search intensity.
Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) show that when consumers search with high intensity, an increase in the number of firms causes prices to drop at a declining rate.
The reason is that it may be beneficial for a firm to undercut prices since with a low number of firms in the market the business-stealing effect dominates the surplusappropriation effect. With a large number of firms, additional entry weakens the business-stealing effect and causes prices to fall less rapidly (and eventually increase).
In other words, when the number of firms in the market is low, a firm may profit from charging the lowest price in order to attract the informed customers. Once there is a sufficiently large number of firms in the market, the probability of charging the lowest prices approaches zero and it may be worthwhile to charge higher prices and target the uninformed consumers. Consequently, our cheapest entrant's price may descend due to competition at a decreasing rate (U-shape).
On the contrary, when consumer search intensity is low, an increase in the number of firms in the market causes prices to first rise and then stagnate. "(…) When the number of firms in the market grows without limit, the probability that a firm is undercut by some other firm converges to 1. It is precisely for this reason that in the limit economy firms set their prices ignoring the fully-informed consumers altogether and concentrating on attracting the less-informed consumers." (Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004, p. 1107) . This implies that our local incumbent suppliers may increase their prices or stay put when competition in the market goes up. What is more, both price effects for the entrants and incumbents cause price dispersion to follow an inverted U-shape relation with the number of firms in the market. Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (2006) support the results by Janssen and Moraga-González: An increase in the number of firms leads to lower average prices for the informed consumers. On the contrary, more firms in the market lead to higher average prices for the uninformed consumers because firms' incentives to undercut prices in order to attract "shoppers" vanish.
In Table 1 we summarize the main predictions of the relevant theoretical literature on our main variables of interest, which we will test empirically. Due to the reasons given above, we expect price dispersion to be related to both consumer information and number of competitors in an inverted U-shape manner.
For incumbent prices, the predictions on the initial effects of consumer information are not clear-cut. Incumbents may cater to the less informed consumers (surplus appropriation) or alternatively they may decrease prices if the upper bound of the price distribution also declines in response to more consumer search (business stealing).
Which effect dominates is ultimately an empirical question. Eventually, i.e. with a lot of consumers searching in the market, we expect also incumbent prices to decline in response to additional consumer search. The predictions for the effects of consumer search on entrant's prices are more clear-cut. Entrants have to lure customers away from incumbents, thus they decrease prices in response to customer search, albeit at a decreasing rate.
Applying the theory of Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales (2004) to our problem, the predictions on the effects of the number of competitors on (incumbent and entrant)
prices are clear-cut, albeit in opposite directions. Incumbents operate in a low to middle search intensity equilibrium, and therefore are expected to increase prices in response to firm entry (at a decreasing rate). Entrants operate in a high-search intensity situation and have to decrease prices to attract informed consumers (at a decreasing rate). Mixed strategy; incentive for firms to undercut prices to attract searchers increases (Stahl, 1989) -/0/+ Incumbents may cater to less informed consumers with lower elasticity of demand (surplus appropriation). In contrast, Stahl (1989) and Tang et al. (2010) predict the incumbent's price (upper bound of the price distribution) to decline.
− Intensity of price competition goes up; demand shifts to lowerpriced firms (Stahl, 1989) Consumer information squared (μ 2 ) − More mass of price support shifts downward; Extreme case, u=1, Bertrand outcome (Stahl, 1989) −/0 Eventually incumbent prices may stagnate or decrease to retain some demand (Stahl, 1989 
Background on Electricity Retail
Almost 17 years have passed since European electricity markets were liberalized ending the former local monopoly regencies in electricity retail. In 2014, a German household could choose on average between 155 electricity retailers each providing 3.4 tariffs. Table 2 shows potential yearly savings (i.e. price dispersions) between the incumbent's base tariff and the cheapest supplier for standard households. Notes: "HH" stands for household. "Obs." are zip code-year observations.
Although switching the provider substantially helps the budget (see Table 2 ) only a small fraction of German households has taken advantage of it until today. However, the share of prospective switching customers used to grow in recent years (see Figure   1 ) as online price comparison sites have significantly disburdened costs of searching cheaper providers, and customers can now easily switch the provider within the time period of a TV break. 14 Nevertheless, 79% of German households were still supplied by their former local incumbent utility in 2014 even though switching to one of the alternative retailers -referred to as entrants hereinafter -would clearly generate substantial savings. 15 In general there are three candidate explanations for these frictions in consumer switching, namely search costs, switching costs and brand effects.
Since electricity is a homogenous product brand effects should not play a major role. 16 There is no reason to assume that the incumbent supplier is more secure in providing electricity since the incumbent has the legal obligation to guarantee a continuous 14 According to a survey 80% of the switchers searched online for alternative providers (A.T. Kearney, 2012) 15 See Monitoringreport (2014, p. 114) from the German Federal Cartel Office and the Federal Network
Agency. 16 Hortacsu et al. (2015) analyze the Texas residential electricity market between 2002 and 2006 and find a brand effect for the incumbent. However, they also point out that it diminishes over time due to consumers' learning.
provision of electricity to the customer. 17 Even when an entrant goes bankrupt, the former incumbent has to back its customers with electricity supply at no additional fees. 18 Nevertheless, not all consumers might be aware of this safety net. Switching costs are also not likely a candidate explanation since a) the switching process is an automated process and conducted by the provider a consumer opts for switching to 19 and b) the cancellation period for the incumbents' base tariffs is only two weeks by law. Therefore, we consider search costs as the main source for observed differences in end-user prices.
Figure 1: Development of supplier changes in electricity retail in Germany
Note: Data are obtained from Bundesnetzagentur (2015).
A comparison portal requires entering information on a customer's expected consumption over one year. Because electricity tariffs are multi-part tariffs and electricity consumption depends on exogenous factors (for instance weather) this opens 17 In this regard, Hortacsu et al. (2015) mention the possibility that customers may believe that the incumbent supplier may exhibit a higher supply security although this is in fact not true. 18 Indeed, two of the bigger alternative providers went bankrupt in 2011 (Teldafax) and 2013 (Flexstrom), respectively. 19 The new supplier will automatically overtake all switching activities for its new customer, such as unsubscribing from the old supplier, registration, etc., at no switching fees. Giulietti et al. (2014) investigate the U.K. electricity retail market, where the switching process can be easily compared with Germany's. They highlight that "Search is perceived by consumers as being significantly more difficult than switching." (p. 561) the possibility to over-or underestimate consumption and as a result the initial choice might not be the best choice (Waddams and Wilson, 2010) . Furthermore, tariffs might include a switching bonus thereby making it only the cheapest tariff for the first year and without engaging in search again the tariff can be disadvantageous for the consumer after the first year. This tariff strategy relies on profits from automatic contract extension due to expected consumer inertia. Montgomery et al. (2004) argue that the use of price-comparison "shopbots" will persist on a rather low level, given the various cognitive costs of evaluating many alternatives. Nevertheless, online price comparison websites have been gaining substantial attention from potential switchers over time.
Data and Empirical Model
The novel and unique data provide a key feature of our paper, since we are able to empirically test the effects of both consumer search and competition on price dispersion (and prices) at the German zip code level for the period 2011-2014. It is of particular relevance that we are able to directly measure consumer search from our information about online search requests (i.e. clicks) for alternative tariffs at major price comparison portals. Besides having suitable measures for our dependent variables and variables of interest, we include a rich set of control variables. In section 4.1., we present descriptive statistics and information on the spatial distribution of some key variables. In section 4.2., we describe our estimation strategy for the econometric approach.
4.1.Data and Variables
Our data stems mainly from two sources. From ene't, a German software and data provider for the electricity industry, we received detailed data on consumer search activities, retail electricity prices and cost components. The marketing company
Acxiom provided data on structural household characteristics in Germany. Since the ene't data are structured at the monthly frequency, we aggregate them to match with the Acxiom data, which are at the yearly level. This corresponds well with the length of a typical electricity contract. Our data span the period 2011-2014. The spatial data resolution is at the German zip code level. In total, the database contains 8,224 zip codes. This bears an advantage over other empirical papers, which have to make assumptions about the delineation of local. 20 Consumers can only choose among electricity tariffs from retailers that supply in their respective zip code. We first describe how we construct our main variables from the data and subsequently provide information on control variables.
Price Dispersion
Our measure for price dispersion (PD) represents the relevant price range, i.e. the difference between the incumbent's price and the cheapest entrant tariff. 21 We define the incumbent's price as the upper bound as even if there were more expensive entrants consumers would not consider them as alternatives. The cheapest price describes the lower bound as in general a provider mostly attracts consumers when it has the lowest price in the market. 22 Prices are measured as end-user tariffs including the fee for the electricity itself, grid charges and other charges, and taxes including the value added tax. The price data are at the zip code level. They are observed on a due date each month and subsequently transformed into yearly averages.
Since we have knowledge on the cost components of electricity supply ( 21 The price range is a common measure for dispersion (see, e.g., Chandra and Tappata, 2011; Pennersdorfer et al. 2015 ). An alternative is the variation in prices, which is not available to us since we only observe the tariffs of the incumbent and cheapest entrant each month. 22 An exemption may be the fraction of consumers who are willing to switch to a green power supplier at a higher tariff. 23 In German "EEG Umlage". 24 EPEX represents the relevant power exchange for Germany.
in value added tax due to the higher prices charged by the incumbent. 25 Accordingly, the Lerner Index represents the ratio of the markup to the price.
Consumer Information
We are interested in the impact of consumer information on actual prices and on price dispersion. The direct measure for consumer information is constructed from In our analysis we will focus on household consumers. The main application is conducted on a typical two person household with a consumption of 3,500 kWh per
year, which represents 35% of all households. 27 We are not able to observe actual switching, because clicking on a certain supplier's tariff at the online comparison website redirects the searcher to a website where the switch can be finalized. This limitation is common to online data (see ). Yet, switching requires searching, so the impact of consumer search on price strategies seems to be consistently estimable. 28 25 There are in some cases also additional but rather small deviations between the incumbents' and the entrants' costs resulting from slightly different costs for metering services. 26 Toptarif is one of the three big electricity and gas price comparison websites along with Verivox and
Check24. It was acquired by Verivox in July 2014 but continues to operate as Toptarif. 27 Our findings are fully robust to the estimations for different household sizes (i.e. different consumption levels). We provide these results upon request. 28 Brynjolsson and Smith (2001) confirm this and find that factors that drive clicks are reasonable and relatively unbiased indicators of sales in their study on online book purchases On this basis we construct a measure of consumer information as follows. Because many searchers conduct several search requests within a search session (e.g. comparing prices for different levels of consumptions) we only count the number of search sessions and refer to a consumer conducting a search session as being fully informed regardless of the depth of the search activity. 29 Furthermore, we exclude 551,256 search sessions which exclusively consider eco-label certified tariffs. Those searches are most likely not predominantly price but rather ideology related and on average 152 Euro more expensive than the cheapest tariff. 30 We then compute our measure of consumer search by aggregating the search sessions within a zip code on a yearly basis and subsequently divide this value by the number of households within the zip code in the respective year. Since we observe some extreme outliers in some zip codes, apparently resulting from price comparing software "bots" or data crawling researchers, we truncate 2% of the upper bound of the sample distribution of our measure of consumer information. 31
Competition
To measure spatial competition we use the number of electricity retail suppliers within a zip code. The number of competitors in a zip code varies between 55 and 198 in our observation period. These data were also provided by ene't.
Control Variables
Data on costs are obtained from ene't. We distinguish between three cost factors with spatial variation, namely (i) fixed grid charges, (ii) variable grid charges, and (iii) concession fees. 32 Fixed and variable grid charges are paid by the electricity provider to the respective system operator and, thus, vary across grid areas (i.e. clusters of zip codes). The concession fee has to be paid by the system operator to the respective zip code (i.e. zip code) for the right to install and operate electric cables on public roads. 29 It should also be noted that a search session only contains the current search activity of an individual household and we cannot distinguish whether the same household starts a new search session on another day. Therefore, we treat each search session as conducted by an individual household. 30 Nevertheless, our results are fully robust to the inclusion of eco label searches. 31 Figure 4 in the Appendix provides a histogram on consumer information before and after the data trimming. Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide histograms on the distribution of the number of competitors and price dispersion. 32 In the regressions, we cannot include other costs, which only vary with time but not across firms (e.g.
wholesale spot price as a proxy for the purchase price of electricity), because these are captured by year fixed effects.
Hence, the concession fees vary at the zip code level. All of these cost components represent parts of the annual electricity bill.
Other control variables refer to structural household characteristics which we received from Acxiom. These data include the (i) average household size, (ii) the share of job seekers, and (iii) income brackets (which may control for consumers' sensitivity to prices and thus impact a household's likelihood to search).
Identification
We are aware of a likely reverse causality (i.e. the problem of endogeneity) between prices and both a) consumer information and b) the number of competitors. 33 There is also likely an effect of prices (and thus also price dispersion) on consumer search because consumers increase search efforts when their electricity bill is high 34 and price dispersion enables consumers to reduce their expenditures (thus increasing their gains from search). As regards b), the levels of prices and price dispersion may also affect entry decisions. For example, high prices may attract new entrants.
We circumvent the endogeneity issue by applying instrumental variable techniques.
We employ the following instruments for consumer information: (1) the share of households with a household head below the age of 40 (U40), (2) the share of households that moved into the zip code (New HH), and (3) the share of households that moved away from the zip code (Moved HH). We instrument for competition with (4) the number of households in the zip code (# HH). The reason why we believe these measures to be adequate instruments are as follows:
With respect to U40, the assumption is that younger people are more familiar with the internet and thus have lower burdens to gather information online at price comparison websites. Under this assumption the share of U40 households will exogenously shift average search intensity in the respective zip code (but not prices or price dispersion). With respect to New HH, we emphasize that new households receive information on their electricity contract from their base supplier (the former 33 In this study, we do not look at a potential relation between search intensity and the number of firms, but employ instrumental variable techniques. According to Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) , search intensity depends on the number of firms in an intricate way. However, as the number of firms is always above 50 and also consumers have no information about the exact number of firms in the market in the absence of searching we argue that consumers' search intensity is unaffected by the number of firms in their local market. 34 See also Hortacsu et al. (2015) who point to higher switching rates in the summer month as a reaction of consumers to high electricity bills from air conditioning. incumbent), which confronts them with their contracts' monetary conditions and thus increases the likelihood to search for alternative tariffs. 35 Regarding Moved HH, we postulate that since moves away from a zip code are not predominantly spontaneous, a household is not likely to search for a new energy contract in the year it moves away.
The number of households within the respective zip code represents a measure of market size, which we expect to exogenously impact competition. A larger market promises more potential customers and, as a result, has an influence on competition. 36 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of our variables employed in the regressions.
Graphical illustrations of the spatial distribution of consumer search intensity, the number of competitors and price dispersion are made available in Figure 7 to Figure 9 in the Appendix. 35 Indeed, a disproportionally high share of switchers are new households (Monitoring Report, 2014) . 36 We see no reason to assume that the number of households has an influence on prices through the presence of economies of scale in retail electricity. This is for the reason that electricity trading represents the main task of electricity retailers, which does not exhibit economies of scale -as opposed to other electricity sectors, such as power generation or transmission. 
The subscripts i, j and t indicate zip codes, supply areas of the incumbents, and years, respectively. Our dependent variables, the measure for consumer search intensity ( ) and the number of competitors ( ), are linear projections of the instruments Num_hh, which is the number of households within a zip code, 40, which is the share of households with the head of the household being under the age of 40, New, which represents the share of households that moved into the respective zip code, and Move, which represents the share of households that moved away. is a vector of all control variables as described above. In our preferred regression we also add regional fixed effects for the 777 incumbents ( ). The reason for including incumbent fixed effects instead of zip code fixed effects is that an incumbent generally operates in multiple zip codes and also the number of competitors rather varies on distribution grid areas (generally the incumbents supply area). 37 Finally, year dummies ( ) capture unobserved time varying components.
Besides the terms in levels, we create instruments for the squared terms of consumer information ( 2 ) and the number of suppliers ( 2 ) in order to allow for nonlinear relations in the structural model. The instruments are the squared predictions of the first stages for and , respectively, from equations 1 and 2: ̂2 instruments for 2 and � 2 for 2 . 38 Thus, the structural equation we estimate takes the following form:
where y denotes price dispersion, price incumbent, and price cheapest entrant, respectively. In alternative specifications, y may alternatively indicate markups or Lerner indices.
Results on Price Dispersion and Prices of Incumbents and Entrants
In this section we discuss the empirical results. Table 4 shows the estimates for Price Dispersion (PD). Furthermore, Table 5 and Table 6 contain regression estimates of incumbents' and the entrants' prices, respectively. In all tables we report reduced form and IV estimates with and without fixed effects (FE). In the case of IV regressions the respective test statistics suggest our instruments to work properly (in the fixed effects models). The instruments are sufficiently strong and the model is The regression results strongly support the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped impact of consumer search on price dispersion, as ̂ is positively significant and ̂2 is 39 The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic (2006) is the multivariate analogue of the first stage F-test.
In case of multiple endogenous variables the Kleibergen-Paap statistic indicates whether the employed instruments do not only identify the endogenous variables individually in the corresponding first stage regressions (as the Angrist-Pischke first stage F-statistic does ), but also whether the endogenous variables are simultaneously identified. This is not necessarily the case, for example, when the instruments are highly correlated. In this circumstance, the same instruments would separately identify each endogenous regressor but the equation as a whole would not be identified. Indeed, in the case of only a single endogenous variable the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is identical to the standard first stage Fstatistic. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the structural equation is underidentified (that is, the rank condition fails). Even though critical values do not exist for the Kleibergen-Paap statistic, the critical values calculated by Stock and Yogo (2005) are generally applied. As a rule of thumb a value of the test statistic above ten indicates identification of the model. 40 First stage regressions are reported in Table 7 in the Appendix. negatively significant. 41 This result underpins Stahl's (1989) theoretical finding that as varies between zero (Diamond Outcome) and one (Bertrand outcome), price dispersion increases first and then declines.
Moreover, we also find an inverted U-shape relation between price dispersion and competition ( � is positive and significant, 2 � is negative and significant). Interestingly, Tables 4 and 5 indicate that price dispersion is caused by contrasting pricing strategies of the incumbent and the entrant rather than by different intensities of the same strategies.
The incumbents' pricing reaction to increased consumer search is best described as inverse U-shaped -an initial increase in price is followed by a decrease after a certain degree of consumer information is achieved -presumably because the surplus appropriation effect initially outweighs the business stealing effect due to the much larger share of uninformed consumers of the incumbent. 42 This finding contradicts Stahl's (1989) theoretical argument that an increase in shifts also initially the upper bound of the price support downwards.
The contrary is true for the group of entrants. Their pricing strategy with respect to consumer information follows a U-shape since the business stealing effect clearly outplays the surplus appropriation effect as all consumers are with the incumbent to begin with when there are no informed consumers. The more consumers get informed, the higher the market shares of the entrants (due to switching). However, it may be that as not all consumers continue to stay informed (i.e. after having switched to the cheapest provider at a certain time they have a high probability to stay there regardless of whether there are cheaper providers after some time), there is also a surplus appropriation effect for the entrants when more consumers get informed.
With regard to the impact of the degree of competition on pricing we observe similar patterns. Price dispersion follows an inverse U-shape with additional firms in the market. This empirical results corresponds well with theoretical findings by Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales (2004). The underlying price setting behavior of entrants and incumbents is as follows. 41 We also apply the method recently developed by Lind and Mehlum (2010) in order to test whether the estimated relationships are actually non-monotonic within the observed data spectrum. 42 Recall that the incumbent has by far the largest market share since all consumers are initially assigned to the incumbent. Thus, switching requires search efforts and all consumers that are still with the incumbent may be viewed as uninformed. See Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales (2004) on business stealing and surplus appropriation effects.
As the number of firms increases, the entrants react with price decreases at a decreasing rate. The intuition behind this finding is that entrants try to undercut their competitors in order to expand their market shares. In this case, the business stealing effect outweighs the surplus appropriation effect. Moreover, with more and more firms in the market, the likelihood of charging the lowest tariff approaches zero. Hence, firm entry weakens the business stealing effect causing prices of entrants to fall less rapidly and eventually to increase.
On the other hand, the incumbent suppliers react with price increases at a decreasing rate due to intensified competition in the market. In this case, the surplus appropriation effect offsets the business stealing effect when increases. The incumbent concentrates on its less-informed customers and charges a higher price as its incentives to undercut entrant prices to attract informed consumers disappears, since its probability of being undercut approaches one.
For our results we reach the conclusion that the general assumption in the theoretical and empirical literature of an equal endowment of informed (and uninformed) consumers across firms is inappropriate. We show that price setting differs across firms, as incumbents and entrants react differently to consumer information and competition, given their heterogeneous proportions of "shoppers" and "non-shoppers".
As a consequence, opposed pricing strategies emerge for firms that are associated with uninformed consumers who are not willing to search for cheaper tariffs (i.e.
incumbents) compared to firms associated with informed consumers who engage in search (i.e. entrants). Estimation of IV models is by IV GMM. Instruments for and are the share of new households, the share of moved households, the share of households where the head is below the age of 40 and the number of households in a zip code. The additional instruments for 2 and 2 are the squares of their respective first stage predictions from equations (1) and (2). All estimations include control variables for regionally varying costs, household characteristics such as income and average household size (persons) as well as year dummies. Significant for * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Figure 2: Impact of Search intensity and competitors on price dispersion and prices.
Note: Curves represent estimates from columns 4 in Table 4 to Table 6 (IV with Fixed Effects). The image does not allow inference on the actual price and price dispersion levels as the constant is not estimated due to fixed effects.
Robustness
Even though we believe that the chosen modelling approach reflects the market best (also indicated by the highest degree of variance explanation by the instruments) our results are surprisingly robust to a variety of specifications. The main results remain largely unchanged regardless whether we change from incumbent fixed effects to zip code fixed effects. In addition, the findings stay robust if we apply as alternative dependent variables the markup dispersion or the Lerner index dispersion (reported in Table 8 - Table 13 in the Appendix). Also, the results are valid for other household sizes (i.e. other consumption levels) like one-, three-, and four-person households and different fixed effect specifications, i.e. zip code level. 43 Moreover, the estimates are also confirmed in a semi-parametric context. With semi-parametric estimation, we allow for more flexible functional forms with regards to consumer search and the number of competitors. We apply Yatchew's (1997 Yatchew's ( , 1998 differencing based semiparametric partial linear method. 44 Search intensity and number of competitors, respectively, are estimated non-parametrically by a local weighted scatterplot smoothing function (LOWESS) while the control variables from equations 3 enter the model linearly. We also include control functions, i.e. first stage residuals from equations 1 ( � 1 ) and 2 ( � 2 ), respectively, in order to consider the endogeneity issue (two-stage residual inclusion, 2SRI We start the description of the semiparametric estimates with the findings for the impact of consumer search. With regard to price dispersion, the parametric estimates are particularly confirmed as the shape of the non-parametrically estimated search function strongly suggests an inverted U-shaped impact of search intensity on price dispersion. Also, the entrants' price adjustments follow a U-shape when search intensity increases. The non-parametrically estimated pricing patterns of the incumbents somehow confirm the parametric estimates, except for low levels of (below 5% consumer information).
Turning to the impact of the number of competitors on prices and price dispersion the results particularly confirm the parametric results. Price dispersion increases at a decreasing rate when the number of competitors gets higher and the same is true for the incumbents' prices. Entrants decrease their prices as a reaction to increased competition. However, with about 120 competitors in the market, the effect becomes less pronounced. 
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate pricing strategies of local incumbents and entrants with respect to consumer information and competition in Germany's electricity retail market. Standard economic theory suggests that prices for a homogenous good, such as electricity, should converge to "the law of one price", as consumers may always switch to the cheapest tariff. Nonetheless, despite the market liberalization 17 years ago, switching rates are low and price dispersion has been persistent. A great share of customers stays with the former monopoly supplier at a relatively high tariff. For a typical two-person household with a yearly consumption level of 3,500 kWh the average incumbent supplier charges EUR 1,004 while the cheapest entrant charges on average EUR 808, implying a relatively large mean price dispersion of EUR 196 or almost 20%.
We stress that significant search frictions (see Stigler, 1961) (5) We derive empirical results for the effects of both consumer search and competition on prices and price dispersion altogether. Hence, we provide a fuller picture on the intricate relations.
The empirical results correspond surprisingly well with hypotheses from the theoretical literature. We estimate an inverse U-shape effect of consumer information on price dispersion, as in Stahl (1989) . That is, an increase in consumer information leads to an increase in the incumbent's price at a decreasing rate (inverse U-shape), while the entrant's price declines at a decreasing rate (U-shape). Moreover, price dispersion follows an inverted U-shape when competition in the market increases. This is in line with theoretical findings by Janssen and Moraga-González (2004 entrants, but can even be opposed according to their "endowment" of informed and uninformed consumers. That is, incumbent firms, which are associated with nonshoppers who do not search for alternative tariffs, follow different pricing strategies with respect to consumer information and competition, compared to entrants, which generally attract "shoppers" who engage in search. Hence it may be either beneficial to raise prices in order to extract rents of consumers who exhibit high search costs
("surplus appropriation"), or conversely, to enlarge market shares by lowering prices to attract shoppers with low search costs ("business stealing"). These two forces eventually cause price dispersion as long as there is heterogeneity in consumer search behavior, so that neither everyone is a "shopper" nor that everyone is a "non-shopper" (i.e. 0< <1). Constant term and year dummies not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses significant for * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The first-stage F test is the Angrist-Pischke F-test for the excluded instruments. Instruments in italics. Note: Description as in Table 4 . #Competitors 2 -0.005 *** -0.001 *** -0.003 *** -0.005 *** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) #Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 Note: Description as in Table 4 . (1) (2) (3) (4) OLS FE IV IV FE Information ( ) 0.280 *** 0.048 *** 0.819 *** 0.678 *** (0.010) (0.006) (0.083) (0.074) Information 2 -0.717 *** -0.143 *** -2.377 *** -1.977 *** (0.029) (0.017) (0.221) (0.196) #Competitors ( ) 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.004 *** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) #Competitors 2 -0.000 *** -0.000 *** -0.000 *** -0.000 *** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) #Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 Note: Description as in Table 4 .
Table 12: Lerner Incumbent Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) OLS FE IV IV FE Information ( ) 0.295 *** 0.037 *** 0.720 *** 0.280 *** (0.009) (0.004) (0.077) (0.047) Information 2 -0.719 *** -0.078 *** -1.853 *** -0.692 *** (0.026) (0.011) (0.203) (0.126) #Competitors ( ) 0.001 *** 0.000 *** -0.000 0.003 *** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) #Competitors 2 -0.000 *** -0.000 *** -0.000 ** -0.000 *** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) #Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 Note: Description as in Table 4 . 
(3) (4) OLS FE IV IV FE Information ( ) 0.014 *** -0.012 ** -0.093 ** -0.399 *** (0.005) (0.005) (0.040) (0.051) Information 2 -0.002 0.065 *** 0.509 *** 1.291 *** (0.013) (0.012) (0.106) (0.134) #Competitors ( ) -0.000 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) #Competitors 2 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) #Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
